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COPYRIGHTS IN FACULTY-CREATED WORKS: HOW
LICENSING CAN SOLVE THE ACADEMIC WORK-FORHIRE DILEMMA
Glenda A. Gertz
Abstract: Many copyrightable works of university faculty members may be works-forhire as defined under current U.S. copyright laws. Copyrights in works-for-hire are treated
differently than copyrights in other works with respect to ownership, duration, termination
rights, and requirements for transfer. Ambiguity over whether a specific faculty-created work
is a work-for-hire creates legal uncertainties and potential future litigation about the initial
ownership of the copyright, length of the copyright term, and termination rights which could
impact all future transfers and licensing. Many universities have attempted to define
ownership of faculty-created works through university policies. These policies are ineffective
to alter the presumption of university ownership of works-for-hire, as they do not meet the
requirements of U.S. copyright laws for a transfer of such ownership. This Comment argues
that the best way to resolve these ambiguities is for the university to retain ownership of the
copyrights in faculty-created works and provide the faculty creator with a license to the
copyrighted work. Although perhaps counterintuitive, this Comment suggests that a licensing
approach would actually result in greater certainty and better protection of the interests of
both the faculty member and the university.

INTRODUCTION
University faculty members engage in a wide variety of activities,
including teaching, research, and writing. Some of these activities result
in the creation of copyrightable materials. As technology has become
more fully integrated into the university environment, the variety of
copyrightable faculty-created works has increased. 1 In the United States,
copyright protection is given to “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression.” 2 In a university setting, original
works of authorship might include software, websites, data compilations,
technical manuals, textbooks, articles, visual artworks, fiction and
non-fiction writings, musical works, video games, and on-line courses,
which may themselves include a variety of copyrightable components
such as text, video, sound, and pictures. There has been some debate
over the past thirty years as to whether the copyrights in such materials

1. See Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of Academic Work
in a Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 267 (2004).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
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belong to the faculty member who created them or to the university as an
employer. 3 During this time period, it has become common practice for
universities to take ownership of patents on faculty inventions, and in
some cases these patents have benefitted the universities financially
through licensing or other commercialization strategies. 4 Some
commenters of the past decade have speculated that universities may
attempt to assert ownership over copyrights as well, particularly when
the materials involved have significant potential commercial value, such
as distance-learning curricula. 5 Many universities have, in fact, adopted
formal copyright policies that address ownership of faculty-created
works. 6 Despite the commenters’ fears, however, most university
policies surveyed express a desire for faculty members to own the
copyrights to “traditional scholarly works.” 7
The question of how to accomplish that stated goal is more difficult
than it might first appear. Some commenters believe that the copyrights
in many faculty works, even traditional scholarly works, belong to the
university as a work-for-hire. 8 Whether a work was created as a
3. See Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay
Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REV. 223 (1992);
Elizabeth Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing “Teacher Exception,” or
Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century University, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209 (2003);
Nathaniel S. Strauss, Anything But Academic: How Copyright’s Work-For-Hire Doctrine Affects
Professors, Graduate Students, and K-12 Teachers in the Information Age, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4
(2011); Robert Ware III, Copyrights, Professors and Public Universities, 16 EDUC. & L.J. 251
(2007).
4. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 212–20 (discussing commercialization strategies at
universities, including commercialization of patents); see also Verdict Form, Carnegie Mellon Univ.
v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290, 2012 WL 6686094, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 2012)
(awarding the University over $1 billion in a patent infringement case).
5. See Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to Faculty
Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275 (2002); Ware III, supra note 3.
6. See Lape, supra note 3 and Packard, supra note 5 for surveys of university copyright policies
at two different points in time.
7. See Packard, supra note 5, at 306 (stating that, as of 2002, 71% of universities surveyed
disclaim ownership of “traditional scholarly work”). The preambles of many university policies
express general support for faculty ownership of scholarly works. See infra Part II.B (regarding the
definition of “traditional scholarly works”); see, e.g., University of California Policy on Copyright
Ownership, http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2100003/CopyrightOwnership (last visited Sept. 26, 2013)
(“This Policy is intended to embody the spirit of academic tradition, which provides copyright
ownership to faculty for their scholarly and aesthetic copyrighted works.”); University of
Washington
Patent,
Invention,
and
Copyright
Policy,
http://www.washington.edu/admin/rules/policies/PO/EO36.html (last visited May 6, 2013) (“[T]he
University acknowledges the right of faculty, staff, and students to prepare and publish, through
individual initiative, articles, pamphlets, and books that are copyrighted by the authors or their
publishers.”).
8. See Alissa Centivany, Paper Tigers: Rethinking the Relationship Between Copyright and
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work-for-hire has a dramatic impact on the treatment of the work under
U.S. copyright law. The copyrights in a work-for-hire are presumed to
belong to the employer rather than the creative employee. 9 The duration
of the copyright in a work-for-hire is different from other works, 10 and a
work-for-hire does not carry termination rights for licenses. 11 A
work-for-hire also has special requirements for transfer of copyrights,
requiring an express writing signed by both the employer and the
employee. 12 A university copyright policy generally does not bear the
signature of both parties and is therefore likely inadequate to alter or
transfer ownership. 13 Because the copyrights in some scholarly works
may belong to the university rather than the faculty member, there is a
risk that assignments and licenses executed by the faculty member are
ineffective. 14
This Comment will argue that the best solution to this problem is not
for universities to disclaim copyrights or assign copyrights to faculty
members, but rather for universities to retain ownership and provide
faculty members with licenses to the copyrights in the works that they
create. By changing their approach from fighting against the
work-for-hire presumption of employer ownership to one which accepts
and works within that presumption, universities and faculty members
will clarify the legal status of copyright ownership, transfers, and
licenses, and can ensure that the rights in faculty-created works are
appropriately distributed.
This Comment begins with a review of the relevant copyright law in
Part I. This discussion includes the early development of the
work-for-hire doctrine and the teacher exception, the changes to the law
as a result of the Copyright Act of 1979, the current trend of applying
agency law concepts to define terms such as “employee” and “scope of
employment,” and the statutory requirements for altering copyright
ownership. Part II discusses the application of copyright law to
faculty-created works and the impact of university copyright policies.
Part III describes the problems that exist within the current model of
Scholarly Publishing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2011); Todd F. Simon, Faculty
Writings: Are They “Works Made For Hire” Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485
(1983).
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2006).
10. Id. § 302.
11. Id. § 203.
12. Id. § 201(b).
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part II.B.
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copyright ownership, under which many university copyright policies
attempt to define ownership of various categories of works. Part IV
offers an alternative model, under which universities would retain
copyright ownership of faculty works, but provide faculty members with
licenses to those works.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE
AND THE TEACHER EXCEPTION

A.

Early Copyright Law Included a Work-For-Hire Doctrine

The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to pass legislation
protecting authors’ rights in their works. Article I, Section 8 gives
Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 15 In 1790, the first
U.S. copyright law was enacted. 16 The Copyright Act of 1790 gave
authors copyright protection for “maps, charts and books” for a
fourteen-year term, along with an additional fourteen years if renewed.17
Although the Copyright Act of 1790 did not specifically address
ownership of works created by employees, at least one court recognized
the existence of a work-for-hire doctrine in 1899. 18 In Colliery Engineer
Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co., 19 the court stated that an
employer was entitled to copyright the literary products of a salaried
employee made in the course of his employment and the employee
“would have no more right than any stranger to copy or reproduce [the
work].” 20 In 1903, the United States Supreme Court cited Colliery
Engineer in support of the proposition that designs “having been
produced by persons employed and paid by the [employers] in their
establishment to make those very things” are owned by the employers. 21
In other words, the employer was considered the “author” of a
copyrightable work created by an employee hired for the purpose of
creating such a work.
Congress revised the copyright laws in 1909, in part to correct
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Copyright Act of 1790.
Id. § I.
Colliery Eng’r Co. v. United Correspondence Schs. Co., 94 F. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1899).
Id.
Id. at 153.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903).
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inconsistencies that had become apparent over time and in part to
accommodate new technologies, such as the player piano and the
phonograph. 22 The Copyright Act of 1909 made a number of changes to
the 1790 Act, including broadening the subject matter that could be
copyrighted to include “all the writings of an author” 23 and doubling the
length of both the initial term and the renewal term. 24 The 1909 Act
explicitly stated, “the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the
case of works made for hire.” 25 However, the Act did not define either
“employer” or “works made for hire.” 26
Courts interpreted the “works made for hire” language of the 1909
Act as being consistent with the prior case law. In Brattleboro
Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 27 the Second Circuit stated,
“[t]his so-called ‘works for hire’ doctrine was recognized earlier by the
Supreme Court . . . and was later codified in the Copyright Act.” 28 The
court went on to describe the work-for-hire doctrine as applying
“whenever an employee’s work is produced at the instance and expense
of his employer. In such circumstances, the employer has been presumed
to have the copyright.” 29 The “instance and expense” test continued to
be used to determine when a copyrightable work fell within the category
of work-for-hire under the 1909 Act. For example, the writings of a
religious leader were held not to be works-for-hire because the
employer, a church founded by the religious leader, was not the
motivating factor in the creation of the works. 30 On the other hand,
President Eisenhower’s book Crusade in Europe was held to be a
work-for-hire because the publisher persuaded President Eisenhower to
write the book and paid for his support staff and illustrations. 31

22. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:45 (2013).
23. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976).
24. Id. at 1080.
25. Id. at 1087–88.
26. Id.
27. 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
28. Id. at 567.
29. Id.
30. See Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322
(9th Cir. 2000) (considering copyright ownership of works governed by the Copyright Act of 1909).
31. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2005)
(considering copyright ownership of works governed by the Copyright Act of 1909).
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A Teacher Exception Was Established Within the Work-For-Hire
Doctrine

Although the “instance and expense” test creates quite a broad
definition of work-for-hire, a teacher’s non-instructional work at a
school or university might not fall into this category. In 1929, the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held in Sherrill v. Grieves 32
that a military instructor owned the copyright in a book he wrote
covering the same subjects that he taught. 33 Clarence Sherrill taught at a
school for army officers. 34 On his own time and initiative, Sherrill wrote
a text on “military sketching, map reading and surveying.” 35 He allowed
the school administration to print a pamphlet for students containing an
excerpt from his copyrighted but, as yet, unpublished book. 36 When
Sherrill sued a third party for publishing an infringing work, the defense
argued that the material in the pamphlet could not be copyrighted, as it
was the property of Sherrill’s employer, the U.S. Government. 37 Under
the Copyright Act of 1909, U.S. Government publications were not to be
copyrighted, but were to be placed in the public domain. 38 Although
Sherrill’s work was not created at the direct instance or expense of his
employer, the defendants argued that the work contained the same
information that Sherrill was employed to teach and, therefore, should be
considered to be within his duties as an instructor. 39 The court rejected
this argument, stating that “[t]he court does not know of any authority
holding that such a professor is obliged to reduce his lectures to writing
or if he does so that they become the property of the institution
employing him.” 40 The court then noted that military officers did write
books that were both copyrighted and used for instruction in military
academies. 41 This decision, with its reliance on custom and lack of
judicial precedent, is commonly cited as the origin of the “teacher
exception” to the work-for-hire doctrine. 42
32. 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929).
33. Id. at 291.
34. Id. at 289.
35. Id. at 290.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 287.
38. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976); Sherrill, 57 Wash. L.
Rep. at 290.
39. Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. Rep. at 290.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 548–49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Strauss, supra note

14 - Gertz Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

12/13/2013 2:16 PM

COPYRIGHTS IN FACULTY-CREATED WORKS

1471

Very few cases since Sherrill can be cited in support of the teacher
exception. In the opinion of Judge Posner, as expressed in Hays v. Sony
Corp. of America, 43 this lack of precedent exists because “virtually no
one questioned that the academic author was entitled to copyright his
writings.” 44 In addition to Sherrill, the case of Williams v. Weisser 45 is
often used to support the existence of a teacher exception under the 1909
Copyright Act. 46 The issue in Williams was whether a person selling his
class notes after attending a lecture was infringing a copyright belonging
to the professor or to the university. 47 Because the lecture was not in any
fixed format, such as written text or recorded sound, it was not protected
by the federal Copyright Act. 48 The only copyright in the lecture was a
common-law copyright under the laws of the State of California, 49 which
the court held belonged to the professor rather than the university. 50
Although the reasoning used by the court was similar to that used by the
Sherrill court, including custom, lack of precedent, and “the undesirable
consequences which would follow from a holding that a university owns
the copyright to the lectures of its professors,” 51 the case did not address
federal copyright law and therefore has limited precedential value with
respect to the existence of a federal teacher exception.
C.

The Copyright Act of 1976 Redefined Work-For-Hire Using
Agency Law Concepts

In 1976, Congress passed another major revision to the federal
copyright laws intended, in part, to conform U.S. copyright laws to the
international copyright provisions of the Berne Convention treaty. 52 This
3, at 12; Ware III, supra note 3, at 256.
43. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
44. Id. at 416.
45. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
46. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 14; Ware III, supra note 3, at 256–57.
47. See Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
48. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077–78 (repealed 1976) (stating that
copyright is secured by affixing the notice of copyright to each copy published or by depositing a
complete copy of a work with the copyright office, thereby implying that the work must exist in
some physical, fixed format). Note that the professor’s own written notes, used in preparing the
lecture, could have been protected by federal copyright. The distinction here is that it was not a copy
of the professor’s notes which was sold, but rather the notes which were written by the seller upon
hearing the oral lecture. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
49. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
50. Id. at 550.
51. Id. at 546.
52. See PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 1:71 (regarding the history of the 1979
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revision included language that expanded on the work-for-hire doctrine.
A “work made for hire” was explicitly defined as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire. 53
For works that fall within the category of “work made for hire,” as
defined above, “the employer . . . is considered the author . . . and,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.” 54
Despite Congress’s attempt to clarify the work-for-hire doctrine, 55 the
courts were again called upon to define the limits of the doctrine. Three
distinct interpretations developed in the federal circuit courts, each using
a different test to decide when a work was created by an employee and
thus fell into category (1) of the definition. 56 The United States Supreme
Court addressed this confusion with its decision in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 57 Reid involved a dispute over ownership
of the copyright in a statue commissioned by a non-profit group. 58 The
dispositive question in Reid was whether the sculptor was an employee
of the non-profit group. 59 As the only decision to date in which the
Supreme Court has interpreted the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976
statute, Reid has been the subject of many commentaries. 60 The relevant
Copyright Act); id. § 1:89 (regarding the legislative history of the Berne Implementation Act of
1988).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
54. Id. § 201(b).
55. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 227–34 (discussing the legislative history of the Copyright
Act of 1976).
56. See, e.g., Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989) (using whether one
party was a formal, salaried employee of the other); Easter Seal Soc’y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d
323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987) (using the rules of agency law); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1984) (using the instance and expense test developed prior to 1976).
57. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
58. Id. at 733.
59. Id. at 738.
60. See Katherine B. Marik, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: New Certainty for
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point for purposes of this Comment is that the Court used the general
common law of agency to interpret the term “employee” as used in
§ 101. 61 Because the Court held that Mr. Reid was not an employee as
defined by agency law, 62 the question of whether the work was made
within the scope of his employment did not arise in this case. It has been
suggested, however, that it would be consistent to apply agency law to
the interpretation of scope of employment as well, 63 especially
considering that, as noted by the Fifth Circuit, “‘scope of employment’
is virtually a term of art in agency law.” 64
D.

The Teacher Exception Did Not Survive the 1976 Revision of
Copyright Law

The Copyright Act of 1976 was noticeably silent with respect to the
teacher exception. One commenter who reviewed the history of the
teacher exception in 2003 included an extensive discussion of the
legislative history of the 1976 Act. 65 That commenter observed that the
teacher exception was never mentioned during the drafting of or debate
regarding the 1976 Act. 66 A number of commenters have argued that the
1976 Act abolished the judicially created teacher exception.67
Since 1976, courts have had few opportunities to consider the
existence of a teacher exception. Two cases, Weinstein v. University of
Illinois 68 and Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 69 regarding faculty
copyright ownership arose in the Seventh Circuit in the 1980s, but
neither case was decided on the basis of a judicially created teacher
exception due to the precise questions on appeal. 70 In Weinstein, one of

the Copyright Work for Hire Doctrine, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 589 (1991); Nancy Barbara Morris,
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: An Incomplete Resolution of the Work for Hire
Controversy, 11 PACE L. REV. 167 (1990); Jennifer Sutherland Lubinski, Comment, The Work for
Hire Doctrine Under Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: An Artist’s Fair Weather
Friend, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 119 (1996).
61. Reid, 490 U.S. at 750–51.
62. Id. at 752.
63. See infra Part II.A.
64. Easter Seal Soc’y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987).
65. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 227–34.
66. Id. at 234.
67. See Leonard D. DuBoff, An Academic’s Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 17 (1984); Simon, supra note 8.
68. 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
69. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
70. Weinstein, 811 F.2d 1091; Hays, 847 F.2d 412.
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several authors of a scholarly article sued his university when the names
of the authors were re-ordered prior to publication. 71 In deciding
ownership of the copyright in the article, the Seventh Circuit considered
the Copyright Act of 1976, the University’s internal copyright policy,
and the existence of academic traditions supporting faculty ownership of
copyrights, but it did not explicitly name or rely on the teacher exception
doctrine. 72 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion argues that the copyright
belonged to the authors, 73 but as the outcome of the case would have
been the same whether the article was a work-for-hire or not, this
argument is dicta. 74
Shortly after the Weinstein case was decided, the Seventh Circuit
heard Hays. 75 This case concerned copyright ownership of a
word-processing manual produced by high school teachers. 76 The
plaintiffs originally sued under common-law copyright, which was
abolished by the Copyright Act of 1976, and therefore inapplicable to
the work in question. 77 The lower court dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim and sanctioned the plaintiffs’ attorney for his conduct in
pursuing the suit. 78 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the sanctions,
which were primarily based on failure to pursue the suit effectively. 79
Despite the fact that the sanctions were not dependent on whether the
complaint was frivolous, 80 the court considered in dicta whether there
might have been a genuine claim for infringement of statutory copyright,
even if there was no valid common-law claim. 81 The answer to that
question hinged on whether the teachers owned the copyright in the
work, or if it was owned by the school district as a work-for-hire. 82 In
his opinion, Judge Posner conducted a thorough review of the work-forhire doctrine and included policy arguments in support of a teacher
exception, but stated that “it is widely believed that the 1976 Act

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

811 F.2d at 1092–93.
Id. at 1094–96.
Id.
Id. at 1095.
847 F.2d 412.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 417–19.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 416.
Id.

14 - Gertz Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

COPYRIGHTS IN FACULTY-CREATED WORKS

12/13/2013 2:16 PM

1475

abolished the teacher exception.” 83
One of the most thorough recent analyses of the teacher exception is
given in Molinelli-Freytes v. University of Puerto Rico (MolinelliFreytes I). 84 In this case, the plaintiffs were professors at the University
of Puerto Rico who developed a proposal for a new graduate program. 85
By the time the University approved and began to implement the
proposal, the parties appeared to have had a falling out, resulting in the
plaintiffs’ suit against the University for copyright infringement over
unauthorized use of the proposal manuscript. 86 The plaintiffs filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction, basing their argument on the
existence of a teacher exception to the work-for-hire doctrine. 87 The
question of whether a teacher exception exists was therefore squarely
before the court. Judge Dominguez’s opinion provided a thorough
review of the history and policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the
teacher exception. 88 On the basis of Congress’s silence with respect to
the teacher exception in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of
1976, the apparent abandonment of the teacher exception by courts
following the 1976 Act, and the Supreme Court’s application of agency
law in Reid, the court held that the teacher exception no longer exists. 89
II.

THE WORK-FOR-HIRE STATUS OF FACULTY-CREATED
WORKS AND THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT
POLICIES

A.

Some Faculty-Created Works Fall Within the Faculty Member’s
Scope of Employment

If the teacher exception has, in fact, been abolished, then the critical
question for ownership of faculty-created works becomes whether the
creation of the copyrighted work was within the faculty member’s scope

83. Id.
84. 792 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.P.R. 2010); see also Pittsburg State Univ./Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v.
Kan. Bd. of Regents/Pittsburg State Univ., 122 P.3d 336, 345–47 (Kan. 2005) (holding that faculty
works are not automatically works-for-hire merely because the faculty are employees, nor are
faculty works automatically subject to a teacher exception, but that the principles of agency law
must be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine the work-for-hire status of a faculty work).
85. Molinelli-Freytes I, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 166–72.
89. Id.
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of employment. 90 Works created by faculty members within the scope of
their employment would belong to the university as works-for-hire. 91
Courts have applied the agency law definition of “scope of employment”
in the context of copyrighted computer software, 92 thus extending the
Supreme Court’s use of agency law in Reid. 93 The Second Circuit
applied the same reasoning to the academic world in Shaul v. Cherry
Valley-Springfield Central School District, 94 which concerned the
copyright ownership of tests and homework problems created by a high
school teacher. 95 The court in Shaul considered the elements of “scope
of employment” found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency: 96
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if,
but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and
space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master. . . . 97
The court found that Shaul’s teaching materials met all three elements,
despite the fact that they were written at least partly outside the regular
school day, stating that:
It is clear that preparing materials for class was the kind of work
that he was employed to perform as a teacher (satisfying the first
prong) and that Shaul was motivated to spend the time to
prepare materials for class in order to fulfill his duties as a
teacher (satisfying the third prong), regardless of his purported
desire to publish the materials. With respect to the second
prong, . . . the very nature of a teacher’s duties involves a
substantial amount of time outside of class devoted to preparing
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992) (using the Restatement
(Second) of Agency to determine that a software program written by an employee on his own time,
but for the purpose of allowing him to perform his job duties more efficiently and with fewer errors,
was a work-for-hire); Roeslin v. District of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1995) (using the
Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine that a software program written by an employee on
his own time for the purpose of creating job opportunities for himself and simply to prove that it
could be done was not a work-for-hire).
93. See supra Part I.C.
94. Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2004).
95. Id. at 184.
96. Id. at 186.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
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lessons, problem sets, and quizzes and tests — which is clearly
within the scope of his employment. 98
The court declined to express an opinion on the existence of a teacher
exception, stating that the academic tradition cited to support a teacher
exception in cases like Weinstein 99 does not include “teaching materials
that were never explicitly prepared for publication.” 100
Determining the kinds of work that fall within a faculty member’s
scope of employment was also a crucial question in a second opinion in
The
the
Molinelli-Freytes
case
(Molinelli-Freytes
II). 101
Molinelli-Freytes I opinion discussed above dealt only with the
plaintiffs’ argument for a teacher exception. 102 Following the finding
that no such exception exists, the University of Puerto Rico moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the University owned the copyright
in the proposal. 103 The University argued that creation of the proposal
was within the plaintiffs’ scope of employment and the proposal was
therefore a work-for-hire. 104 In an unpublished opinion, Magistrate
Judge McGiverin considered each of the relevant elements of agency
law. 105 First, the court found that the graduate program proposal was the
kind of work plaintiffs were employed to perform, on the basis of
plaintiffs’ status as University employees, their job descriptions, and an
assessment of the regular duties of University faculty. 106 Second, the
court found that the work was created within the authorized time and
space, even though plaintiffs had done much of the work at home,
because the University gave faculty the flexibility to work at home, and
on evenings and weekends, in the performance of their jobs. 107 Finally,
the court found that plaintiffs were motivated by a desire to further the
interests of the university in the creation of the proposal, as they
“designed it with the intent of submitting it to the . . . approval process,
and . . . actually did so.” 108 Having found all three elements satisfied, the
98. Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186.
99. 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
100. Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186.
101. See Molinelli-Freytes v. Univ. of P.R. (Molinelli-Freytes II), Civil No. 09-1655
(DRD/BJM), 2012 WL 4665638, *11–13 (D.P.R. Feb. 15, 2012).
102. Molinelli-Freytes I, 792 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.P.R. 2010); see supra Part I.D.
103. Molinelli-Freytes II, 2012 WL 4665638, at *1.
104. Id. at *11.
105. Id. at *12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *13.
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court held that the proposal was, in fact, written within the scope of
plaintiffs’ employment. 109
B.

Universities Have Attempted to Define Copyright Ownership
Through the Use of Internal Copyright Policies

In an effort to address the uncertainty regarding whether a teacher
exception survived following the Copyright Act of 1976, an increasing
number of universities have adopted institutional policies regarding
copyright ownership. 110 Two prior studies have surveyed university
policies. In 1992, Laura Lape surveyed the seventy universities
classified as “Research Universities I” by the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching. 111 In 2002, Ashley Packard surveyed the
copyright policies of the same seventy universities.112 The Carnegie
Foundation updates its classifications every five years, and the most
recent version uses “Research Universities – Very High Research
Activity” as the equivalent class to the one used in the 1992 survey. 113
This class contains 108 universities, the copyright policies of which
were surveyed for the present Comment. 114 These policies appear to take
one of two basic approaches. 115 The first approach, used by
approximately one-third of the policies, is to generally claim ownership
of faculty works, with exceptions for specific kinds of works in which
university ownership is disclaimed. 116 The second approach, used by

109. Id.
110. See Lape, supra note 3, at 252 (surveying the copyright policies of large research
universities and finding that fifty-four out of seventy universities surveyed had such a policy in
place); Packard, supra note 5, at 294 (surveying the same universities and finding that sixty-six had
such a policy in place ten years after the initial survey).
111. See Lape, supra note 3, at 252.
112. See Packard, supra note 5, at 294.
113. See Carnegie Foundation, Classification Descriptions, CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/descriptions/ (last
visited Aug. 17, 2013) for a description of the classifications used for the Foundation’s 2010
classification.
114. See Carnegie Foundation, Basic Classification Descriptions, CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/descriptions/basic.php
(follow “RU/VH” hyperlink) for a list of universities in the Very High Research Activity class as of
the Foundation’s 2010 classification. A compilation of the university copyright policies reviewed
for this Comment is available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/featuredarticles/
dec13.aspx.
115. These are very broad categories and while the distinction is clear for some policies, others
are more difficult to categorize. The statistics that follow are based on this author’s interpretation of
the policy language.
116. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Cal., University of Southern California Intellectual Property Policy
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approximately two-thirds of the policies, is to generally disclaim
ownership of faculty works, with exceptions for specific kinds of works
in which university ownership is claimed. 117
Both groups of policies typically disclaim ownership of “traditional
scholarly works,” which is variously defined, but generally includes
textbooks, popular or scholarly non-fiction, novels, poems, musical
works, dramatic works, and works of art. 118 Some policies include a
statement explaining the university’s motivation in disclaiming these
works. The reasons given commonly include academic tradition,
preservation of faculty members’ academic freedom, and a desire to
encourage production and dissemination of scholarly works. 119
Most policies of both kinds typically claim ownership of works
created by employees specifically assigned to create such works and
works created with significant or unusual use of university resources. 120
§ 2.1 (Apr. 3, 2001), available at http://policies.usc.edu/p4acad_stud/intellectual_property.pdf; N.Y.
Univ., Statement of Policy on Intellectual Property §§ XI.A(1), XI.B (July 1, 2012), available at
http://www.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/IPPolicyFINAL.pdf.
117. See, e.g., Brandeis Univ., Intellectual Property Policy § III.A. (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.brandeis.edu/ora/policies/intelproppolicy.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013); Brown Univ.,
Brown University Patent and Invention Policy and Copyright Policy § 2.2 (May 27, 2005),
available at http://research.brown.edu/pdf/newpatent%20policy.pdf.
118. See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Policy (Nov. 2, 2002): Copyrights
§ IV.C. (rev. Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.cfo.pitt.edu/policies/policy/11/11-02-02.pdf
(defining “Scholarly Works” as “courseware, popular nonfiction, novels, textbooks, poems, musical
compositions, films, webpages, lecture notes, dramatic works or other works of artistic
imagination”); Univ. of Minn., Board of Regents Policy: Copyright § II.4 (Dec. 14, 2007), available
at http://regents.umn.edu/sites/default/files/policies/Copyright.pdf (defining “Academic Work” as
“a scholarly, pedagogical, or creative work, such as an article, book, textbook, novel, work of visual
art, dramatic work, musical composition, course syllabus, test, or class notes”).
119. See, e.g., Columbia Univ., Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright Policy (June 3,
2000), available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/provost/docs/copyright.html (“Faculty at the
University must be free to choose and pursue areas of study and concentration without interference,
to share the results of their intellectual efforts with colleagues and students, to use and disseminate
their own creations, and to take their created works with them should they leave the University.”);
Dartmouth Coll., Copyright Ownership Policy (Sept. 27, 1994), available at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~osp/resources/policies/dartmouth/copyright.html (“As a matter of
fundamental principle, however, the College encourages wide dissemination of scholarly work
produced by members of the Dartmouth community, including copyrightable works.”); N.D. State
Univ.,
Policy
Manual:
Section
190
(rev.
Nov.
2010),
available
at
http://www.ndsu.edu/fileadmin/policy/190.pdf (“The primary purposes of this policy are to
encourage and promote research and scholarship based on the traditional principles of the academic
profession.”).
120. See, e.g., Univ. of Va., Policy: Ownership Rights in Copyrightable Material (Apr. 1, 2004),
available
at
https://policy.itc.virginia.edu/policy/policydisplay?id=%27RES-001
(defining
“significant” use of university resources as “substantial and dedicated use of University equipment,
facilities, or personnel”); Univ. of Notre Dame, Intellectual Property Policy at the University of
Notre Dame (Jan. 27, 2003), available at http://policy.nd.edu/policy_files/IntellectualProperty
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These provisions often explicitly reference the work-for-hire provisions
of copyright law and some use specific assignment, significant use of
university resources, or other similar factors to identify works that fall
within the scope of employment. 121
Two leading treatises on copyright law, Nimmer on Copyright and
Abrams on Copyright, argue that these policies are not effective to alter
copyright ownership of a work-for-hire. 122 Under 17 U.S.C. § 201(b),
the initial authorship of a work-for-hire may be changed, but an express
written agreement signed by both parties is required.123 Nimmer points
out three cases that suggest that a university copyright policy does not
meet the § 201(b) requirement. 124 In the first case, Manning v. Board of
Trustees of Community College District No. 505, 125 a university staff
photographer argued that he owned the copyright in his photographs,
which were works-for-hire. 126 The court found that a collective
bargaining agreement that included a policy statement asserting that

Policy.pdf (defining substantial use of university resources as “the utilization of University
facilities, equipment, personnel (including graduate students), or other resources beyond that which
is normally provided to carry out one’s assigned duties”); Univ. of Ill., Article III: Intellectual
Property § 4(a)(2) (Sept. 3, 1998), available at http://www.trustees.uillinois.edu/trustees/
agenda/September-10-2009/009-sep-General-Rules-att.pdf (claiming ownership of “[w]orks created
as a specific requirement of employment or as an assigned University duty”); Or. State Bd. of
Higher Education, Licensing, Patent, Educational, and Professional Materials Development and
Copyright
Policies
and
Procedures
§ 6.215(2)
(Oct.
1998),
available
at
http://www.ous.edu/sites/default/files/about/polipro/files/IMD_2013-01.pdf (claiming ownership of
materials “when the individual was employed for the specific purpose of preparing or producing the
material, or was specifically directed to develop the material as part of general employment duties
and responsibilities”).
121. See, e.g., Yale Univ., Yale University Copyright Policy § 2 (Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.yale.edu/ocr/pfg/policies/copyright.html (“Under the Copyright Law, the copyright to a
work created by a person in the course of his or her employment belongs to the employer rather than
to the individual creator. The law provides, therefore, that works created by faculty members in the
course of . . . their jobs, are the property of the University.” The policy then specifies works that fall
into the course of employment, including assigned tasks, and when the University has committed
substantial resources to the work.); Univ. of S.C., Intellectual Property Policy § IV.A. (rev. Apr. 26,
2005), available at http://www.sc.edu/policies/acaf133.html (“It is the policy of the University that
all rights in copyright shall remain with the creator unless the work (a) is a work-for-hire (and
copyright vests in the University under copyright law), (b) is supported by a direct allocation of
funds through the University for the pursuit of a specific project, (c) is commissioned by the
University, or (d) is otherwise subject to contractual obligations.”).
122. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[D] (2013)
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]; 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 4.26
(2012).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
124. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 122, § 5.03[D].
125. 109 F. Supp. 2d 976 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
126. Id. at 978.

14 - Gertz Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

COPYRIGHTS IN FACULTY-CREATED WORKS

12/13/2013 2:16 PM

1481

copyrights were owned by staff members did not satisfy the § 201(b)
requirement for an express writing signed by both parties. 127 The second
case, Rouse v. Walter & Associates, L.L.C., 128 concerns the copyright in
a software program designed to rate beef cattle that was written, in part,
by University of Iowa professors. 129 The Rouse court found that the
plaintiffs were university employees who created the software as a
work-for-hire, and that a university copyright policy contained in a
faculty handbook did not satisfy the § 201(b) requirements to alter
ownership. 130 The final case discussed is Foraste v. Brown University, 131
another university photographer copyright suit. 132 As in Manning, the
court found that the photographs in question were works-for-hire and
that the University’s copyright policy did not alter copyright ownership,
as it did not meet the § 201(b) requirements. 133
Interestingly, the plaintiff in Foraste made an alternative argument
that even if the photographs were works-for-hire and the copyrights
originally vested in the university, the university’s copyright policy
operated to transfer the copyright back to the employee who created the
work. 134 For works that are not works-for-hire, the 1976 Act allows the
copyright to be transferred to another party with a written instrument
signed only by the transferor, 135 rather than by both parties, as required
for works-for-hire. The court was not persuaded by this argument,
however, and found that an employer’s transfer of a work-for-hire to the
employee must comply with the § 201(b) requirements. 136 Allowing a
work-for-hire owned by the University to be transferred to the employee
under the general provisions of the Copyright Act would, according to
the Foraste court, circumvent the work-for-hire provision and be
contrary to the statutory text’s plain meaning. 137

127. Id. at 981.
128. 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
129. Id. at 1045–46.
130. Id. at 1062–64.
131. 248 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.R.I. 2003).
132. Id. at 73.
133. Id. at 81.
134. Id. at 74 (The court quotes the University’s copyright policy as stating, in part: “It is the
University’s position that, as a general premise, ownership of copyrightable property which results
from performance of one’s University duties and activities will belong to the author or originator.”).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).
136. Foraste, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
137. Id.
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III. THE CURRENT MODEL FOR FACULTY COPYRIGHT
OWNERSHIP CREATES LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES
As discussed in Part II, the existence of a teacher exception is now
seriously in doubt, and the work-for-hire status of a particular work is a
question of law independent of the parties’ traditional understanding.
This creates problems for the current model for ownership of
faculty-created works, which relies on either the existence of a teacher
exception or the parties’ ability to define what constitutes a work-forhire. This Part will argue that the ownership of faculty-created works is
ambiguous under the current model, and will discuss the possible
repercussions of that ambiguity.
A.

Work-For-Hire Status is Determined Using a Complex,
Multi-Factor Test

The Copyright Act’s work-for-hire provisions contain terms that are
interpreted under the rules of agency law, as seen in Reid and Shaul. 138
The factors that a court considers when determining whether creation of
any given copyrightable work is within an individual’s scope of
employment are particularly difficult to apply in the context of faculty
works. 139 When considering whether a university faculty member’s work
falls within the scope of his or her employment, a court would need to
decide if: (1) it is the kind of work the faculty member was employed to
perform, (2) the work occurs substantially within the employer’s
authorized time and space limits, and (3) the work was motivated
partially by a desire to further the interests of the university. 140
None of these elements fall decisively one way or the other with
regard to traditional scholarly works, such as textbooks and journal
articles. With respect to the first element, some commenters have argued
that production of scholarly works is not the kind of work that faculty
members are employed to perform because the university typically does
not assign a specific faculty member to write a specific article on a
specific topic. 141 Others, however, have argued that the production of
scholarly works is expected of all faculty members and is one of the

138. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742–43 (1989); Shaul v. Cherry
Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2004).
139. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 590, 602 (1987).
140. See Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
141. See Scully, supra note 1, at 253; Townsend, supra note 3, at 240–41.
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criteria on which faculty performance is judged, suggesting that it is the
kind of work they are employed to perform. 142 The second element is
equally problematic. When universities permit their faculty members to
have flexible working hours and locations, the time and space element
alone cannot be used to categorize works as within or outside the scope
of employment. 143 The third element, motivation, is fundamentally
subjective. It seems likely that most scholarly works are motivated by a
combination of factors, possibly including the desire to promote one’s
own career, the desire to promote the reputation of the university or
department, and the desire to contribute to the advance of thought in the
field. Agency law requires only that the motivation be in part to benefit
the employer, 144 which could be plausibly argued in almost any faculty
works context.
The elements of scope of employment are sufficiently complex to
make it difficult to predict the outcome for any given scholarly work by
a faculty member. The status of any given work as a work-for-hire is
unclear, leaving the question of whether the copyright in the work
belongs to the faculty member or the university unresolved.
B.

University Copyright Policies That Disclaim Ownership Are Not
Effective

University copyright policies typically disclaim ownership of
traditional scholarly works. 145 The assumption appears to be that if the
university disclaims ownership, ownership will somehow “revert” to the
faculty member. 146 If the work in question is a work-for-hire, however,
this disclaimer does not satisfy the Copyright Act’s requirement for an
express writing signed by both parties. 147 University copyright policies
are broad statements of policy and procedure and do not adequately
define the works to be transferred, nor are they generally signed by
individual faculty members. 148 Reliance on a copyright policy alone,
therefore, will not settle copyright ownership issues satisfactorily.

142. See Simon, supra note 8, at 501–09; Strauss, supra note 3, at 45.
143. See Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186; Molinelli-Freytes II, No. 09-1655, 2012 WL 4665638, at *12
(D.P.R. Feb. 15, 2012).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
145. See supra Part II.B.
146. See supra Part II.B.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006); see supra Part II.B.
148. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 405–08.
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C. The Express Writing Requirement of Section 201(b) Provides No
Equitable Protection for Faculty Members
The requirement for an express, signed writing to transfer copyright
ownership has been likened to the signed writing requirement of the
statute of frauds. 149 For those types of contracts that fall under the statute
of frauds, a writing must reasonably identify the subject matter, indicate
that the parties have reached agreement, and state the essential terms of
the agreement with reasonable certainty. 150 In the work-for-hire context,
§ 201(b) requires an express writing signed by both parties, which
ensures that both parties understand who will own the completed
work. 151 As with the statute of frauds, no equitable defenses are
available to parties who allege the existence of an oral or implied
contract. 152 Some commenters have argued that university copyright
policies, even if not legally effective to transfer copyright ownership,
estop the university from asserting ownership against the faculty
member. 153 This line of reasoning fails to consider that estoppel is a
form of equitable defense and, as such, is not available in disputes over
ownership of copyrights. 154 Therefore, in the absence of an express,
signed writing, there can be no transfer of copyright ownership.
D.

The Duration of a Copyright Is Dependent on the Work’s Status as
a Work-For-Hire

Understanding whether a given work falls within the work-for-hire
category is important for more than just deciding ownership.
Work-for-hire status also determines the duration of the copyrights and
whether licenses are subject to termination. 155 Copyrights in works that
were not created as works-for-hire last for the life of the author plus
seventy years. 156 For works-for-hire, the copyrights last for either 120
years from the creation of the work or ninety-five years from the first
publication of the work, whichever is shorter. 157 Although in many cases
149. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1981).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
152. See Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 936–37.
153. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 411.
154. See Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 937; Neva, Inc. v. Christian Duplications Int’l, Inc., 743 F.
Supp. 1533, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
155. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 302.
156. Id. § 302(a).
157. Id. § 302(c).
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the value of faculty-created works is weighted toward the present, there
are some works that will continue to be cited and reproduced for many
years. 158 If there is no consensus on whether the work was originally a
work-for-hire or not, it will create uncertainty and potential litigation in
the future over the length of the copyright term.
Further ambiguity is introduced by the question of termination.
Licenses in works that were not originally created as works-for-hire may
be terminated by the copyright holder anytime during the five years
following the thirty-fifth year of the copyright. 159 This termination right
is owned by the author’s spouse, children, or grandchildren if the author
dies. 160 Licenses in works-for-hire are not subject to termination.161 This
distinction could be significant for licensees of scholarly works, such as
textbook publishers. The length of the copyright term and the existence
of a termination right are likely to be significant issues in negotiating the
terms under which the copyrights are licensed. Knowing with confidence
whether a given work is a work-for-hire is therefore important to both
licensees and licensors.
E.

University Policies That Decide Ownership by Genre of Work May
Be Ambiguous or Controversial

Many university copyright policies provide lists of the kinds of works
the university claims ownership of and the kinds of works that they
intend to belong to faculty members. 162 These lists tend to divide works
between the two categories by genre. For example, copyrightable
software is usually claimed for the university, while textbooks are
usually disclaimed by the university. 163 If the ownership of the work is a
158. Textbooks tend to require frequent updating while works of a more literary or artistic nature
may have a longer lifespan. For example, James Watson, the Nobel Prize-winning biologist, wrote a
textbook in 1965 entitled Molecular Biology of the Gene. Although still in use, the textbook is
currently in its seventh edition and now carries the names of five additional authors. In contrast,
Watson’s popular account of the events leading to the discovery of DNA’s molecular structure, The
Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA, was written in 1968
and is still available in essentially its original form. Both works were created while Watson was a
member of the Harvard University faculty and, if they had been created after the passage of the
Copyright Act of 1976, would be subject to the kind of copyright ambiguities discussed by this
Comment.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).
160. Id. § 203(a)(2).
161. Id. § 203(a).
162. A compilation of the university copyright policies reviewed for this Comment is available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/featuredarticles/dec13.aspx.
163. See Georgetown Univ., Faculty Handbook: Intellectual Property § I (rev. May 4, 2006),
available at http://www1.georgetown.edu/facultyhandbook/toc/section4/sub2/; Univ. of Mich.,
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binary decision, either going solely to the university or solely to the
faculty member, then the decision to place a given genre in one category
or the other will determine ownership of all the rights in all works within
that genre. This could make writing and enforcing such a policy
controversial within the university community, particularly as hybrid or
completely new forms of faculty works—such as those used in distance
learning applications—are developed.
Problems may also arise when works do not fit neatly into one of the
listed categories. This seems most likely to happen when new forms of
works are developed which may not have been provided for in an
existing copyright policy. For example, when distance-learning curricula
were first developed at universities, which policy category the new
curricula fell into was often unclear. 164 Some university policies include
dispute-resolution processes, generally providing for adjudication by
university representatives. 165 Resolving a complex, hard-fought dispute
could therefore constitute a drain on university resources and a
distraction to faculty and administrators.
F.

Copyright Ownership May Be Governed by Multiple University
Policies

Copyright ownership of works created by faculty members is usually
addressed in a university’s copyright policy, but other university policies
may also impact copyright ownership. Universities often have ethics
rules, conflict of interest policies, and outside activities policies that bear
on ownership of faculty-created works. 166 In one situation where
ownership of certain teaching materials was in dispute, it was reported
that the university amended its employment policies to prohibit faculty
Standard Practice Guide No. 601.28 § B (Sept. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.lib.umich.edu/files/services/copyright/601.28%20%281%29.pdf.
164. See Michael W. Klein, “The Equitable Rule”: Copyright Ownership of Distance-Education
Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L. 143, 150 (2004).
165. See, e.g., Ariz. Bd. of Regents, Policy No. 6-908: Intellectual Property Policy § D.5. (rev.
Aug.
2010),
available
at
https://azregents.asu.edu/rrc/Policy%20Manual/6-908Intellectual%20Property%20Policy.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2013); Harvard Univ., Statement of
Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property § VI (rev. Oct. 4, 2010), available at
http://otd.harvard.edu/resources/policies/IP/IPPolicy.pdf.
166. See, e.g., Purdue Univ., Ethics Policy § III.B.1: Conflicts of Commitment and Reportable
Outside
Activities
(rev.
Aug.
31,
2012),
available
at
http://www.purdue.edu/policies/ethics/iiib1.html; Ind. Univ., Policy on Conflicts of Commitment
Involving
Outside
Professional
Activities
(Nov.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.indiana.edu/~ufc/docs/policies/ConflictsCommitment.pdf (policies specifying limits on
time spent, income received, and type of activities which may constitute a potential conflict of
commitment and require reporting to the administration).
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from engaging in some kinds of outside activities rather than address the
issue over ownership of the works directly. 167 Requiring faculty and
administrators to refer to multiple policies in order to determine the
copyright status of a faculty-created work creates additional potential for
confusion in an already ambiguous situation.
G.

Current Policies May Require Onerous Paperwork to Be
Enforceable

Although a blanket university policy does not satisfy the § 201(b)
requirement for an express writing signed by both parties, it is certainly
possible for universities and faculty members to create such a writing to
alter the ownership of works-for-hire. The amount of paperwork
required to do this on a routine basis, however, may be a significant
burden. In order to comply with the requirements of § 201(b), the
university would need to execute a contract with each faculty member
describing the works to be owned by the faculty member. 168 Further, the
federal copyright statute has been interpreted to require that an
agreement altering copyright ownership of a work-for-hire must be made
before the work is completed.169 This prevents universities and faculty
members from altering the presumption of employer copyright
ownership retrospectively. Any transfer of copyrights in works already
completed would require an additional contract between the university
and the faculty member, adding unnecessary complexity to the situation.
In many cases, faculty members, believing that they own the
copyrights in their works, have executed agreements assigning those
copyrights to publishers. 170 In the event that the work in question was
actually a work-for-hire, the copyright never belonged to the faculty

167. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 7; Townsend, supra note 3, at 218–19.
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
169. There is currently a circuit split on whether the agreement must also be in writing before the
work is completed, or if an oral agreement that is put into writing after completion of the work is
effective. The Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit have disallowed after-completion agreements. See
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1992); Gladwell Gov’t
Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Marin, 265 F. App’x 624, 625–26 (9th Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit and
district courts in Alaska, Texas, and Puerto Rico have allowed after-completion agreements that
confirm an earlier oral agreement. See Campinha-Bacote v. Rearden, No. 3:10-cv-00139-JDR, 2011
WL 1343343, at *3 (D. Alaska Apr. 8, 2011); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 558–59
(2d Cir. 1995); TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Prods., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206–07 (D.P.R. 2004);
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 839, 842–44 (S.D. Tex. 2001);
Zyware, Inc. v. Middlegate, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 2348 (SHS), 1997 WL 685336, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
4, 1997).
170. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 387.
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member, making the assignment ineffective. 171 The large number of
textbooks and other works that have been assigned to publishers by
faculty members over the years means that casting doubt on the legal
status of these works would create a tremendous disruption. Publishers
would likely have to contract with the university to resolve this situation,
creating an additional strain on university resources as these contracts
are negotiated and executed.
IV. LICENSING WORKS-FOR-HIRE TO FACULTY MEMBERS
PROVIDES GREATER CERTAINTY
Because there is significant ambiguity in the work-for-hire status of
faculty-created works under the current model, there is also significant
risk that, in the event of a dispute, the ownership of these works would
not be resolved consistently with the parties’ intent. As discussed in Part
III.B, universities’ attempts to resolve this problem using copyright
policies are probably inadequate. This Part argues that universities and
faculty members can accomplish their goals with respect to control of
copyrighted works without ambiguities by using a licensing model rather
than an assignment model.
A.

Universities Should Retain Ownership of Copyrights in FacultyCreated Works

When universities attempt to give ownership of works-for-hire to
faculty members, they are fighting against the presumption of employer
ownership in the Copyright Act. 172 As a result, the process required to
transfer ownership is burdensome and the result is often unclear. 173
Recent case law reflects a trend toward abolishing the teacher exception
and finding that many faculty works belong to the university as
works-for-hire. 174 It is time for universities and faculty to move to a new
model of copyright ownership that takes these legal realities into
account. The first step is for universities to include the creation of
traditional scholarly works within the scope of employment for faculty
members. Although university policies cannot remove works from the
work-for-hire category, as that determination is a matter of law, 175

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See supra Part II.B.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.A, Part I.D.
See PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5:47.
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university policies and employment contracts can broaden the scope of a
faculty member’s employment, thus including additional works within
the works-for-hire category. This would allow all faculty-created works
to begin in the same, well-defined legal category. 176 Universities should
then accept ownership of copyrights for all faculty-created works.
Although seemingly counter to the parties’ intent, university ownership
will provide a clear, legally grounded starting point for all further
licensing and assignment of rights. This will, in turn, allow the parties to
create effective, enforceable agreements that allocate the copyrights in
scholarly works in an appropriate manner.
B.

Universities Should License Copyrights to the Faculty Member

It appears from university copyright policies that universities want to
provide faculty members with the copyrights to their traditional
scholarly works. 177 The simplest way to accomplish this goal is for the
university to provide the faculty member with an exclusive license to the
copyrights in his or her work. 178 A licensing approach avoids many of
the problems that are present in a scheme dependent on university policy
statements. Because licensing does not invoke the requirement of
§ 201(b) for the signatures of both parties, it is much easier to write and
execute an effective license than to attempt to transfer ownership.
Licensing contracts are subject to the statute of frauds, if such a
provision exists in the relevant state law, but only to the same extent as
any other contract not to be performed within one year.179 Courts may
find an informal letter, a series of related documents, or a memorandum
signed by one party sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.180 A

176. There are limits to what can be included in the works-for-hire category, as this is still a
matter of law and will be decided using agency principles. For example, musical compositions
created at home by a chemistry professor, and having no relation to any subjects of the professor’s
research or teaching would probably not be considered within the professor’s scope of employment
regardless of broad contractual provisions. Materials relating to a faculty member’s teaching or
research topics, however, can plausibly be included within the scope of employment and some have
argued that such material already falls within that scope. See discussion supra Part II.A.
177. See supra Part II.B.
178. There is some debate as to whether an exclusive license is equivalent to transfer of
ownership. See ABRAMS, supra note 122, § 4:44. Analysis of this question is beyond the scope of
the present Comment, however the issue could be avoided by retention for the university of some
rights. The right to internal use for educational purposes, for example, is commonly mentioned in
university copyright policies as being retained by the university and may not be objectionable to
faculty members.
179. See MELVIN F. JAGER, LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK § 8:7 (2012).
180. Id.
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university copyright policy that purports to transfer ownership cannot be
enforced under the doctrine of estoppel, as discussed previously, 181 but a
policy that states the university’s intent to license works could be
enforced under estoppel in the event of a future dispute. As
works-for-hire, the faculty works being licensed would not be subject to
termination rights, further protecting faculty members’ rights in the
event of a future change in university policy. 182 An additional advantage
of licensing is that it allows the parties to divide the rights according to
their respective interests. Many current university policies seek to retain
the right to use the works internally, even when they attempt to transfer
ownership to the faculty member. 183 Under a license, the university
could easily retain the rights that it values most, while granting to the
faculty members the rights that are of most importance to them.
C.

The Rights Granted in a License Can Be Customized for Different
Types of Works

Under current university policies, works are divided into only two
buckets: those the university will own and those the faculty member will
own. 184 Determining which category a given work fits within becomes a
high-stakes decision, as one party gets all the rights and the other gets
nothing. 185 Licensing could decrease the controversy around
categorizing works by allowing the creation of more buckets.
Universities can create a full set of categories that distribute the rights
between the university and the faculty member in ways that make sense
for a variety of works. For example, the university could retain full
rights in an administrative proposal, grant some rights to the faculty
member for distance learning curricula, grant more or different rights to
the faculty member for teaching materials, and grant all rights to the
faculty member for textbooks. By providing a variety of options,

181. See supra Part III.C.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2006).
183. See, e.g., Northwestern Univ., Copyright Policy § A.1.b (Sept. 1, 2006), available at
http://invo.northwestern.edu/policies/copyright-policy (“[T]he Creator shall grant, or use best efforts
to cause others to grant, to the University a perpetual, royalty-free right and license to use, perform,
display, copy, or reproduce such works, for all traditional, customary or reasonable academic or
research purposes of the University.”); Kan. Bd. of Regents, Policy and Procedures Manual II.D.
§ 8(a)(2) (rev. Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://www.kansasregents.org/resources/PDF/2582BoardPolicyManual.pdf (“Except for textbooks, institutions shall have royalty-free use of the
[scholarly] work within the institution, unless otherwise agreed in writing.”).
184. See supra Part III.E.
185. See supra Part III.E.
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universities and faculty should be able to reach an agreement on rights in
a specific work that addresses the interests of both parties. Additionally,
providing a variety of licensing options could allow universities to
permit some kinds of outside work that may currently be prohibited due
to an inability to agree on copyright ownership of the works involved.
Providing a variety of licensing options would create a system that is
flexible enough to adapt to the specific copyright needs of faculty
members and universities in a wide variety of circumstances.
D.

Publishers Should Accept Licenses from Faculty

It is common practice for publishers of scholarly works to require that
faculty authors assign their copyrights to the publisher. 186 If many of
these works were in fact works-for-hire, then the copyrights are held by
the university, making these assignments ineffective. 187 Rather than
requiring an assignment of rights, however, publishers can accept
licenses to the copyrights, as is done in the non-academic publishing
industry. 188 If the university grants a license to the faculty member
which permits sub-licensing, the faculty member is then free to sublicense his or her rights to a publisher. 189 If exclusivity is important to
the publisher, the faculty member can grant an exclusive sub-license. If
the publisher wants to be able to sell its rights in the work, the faculty
member can grant a transferrable license. As the faculty member can
only sub-license the rights that have been licensed to him or her, 190 it
will be important to ensure that the faculty member is granted
appropriate rights for works intended for publication. As long as this
factor is taken into account, it is difficult to imagine a situation that
could not be addressed satisfactorily by licensing the appropriate rights.
E.

Attribution Provisions Can Ensure that Faculty Members Receive
Credit for Their Works

Faculty members may be concerned about receiving appropriate
credit for their scholarly writings when they do not own the copyrights
in the works. It is likely to the benefit of both the university and the

186. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 379 (discussing academic publishing practices).
187. See supra Part III.B.
188. See ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING
AND THE ARTS § 5:13 (3d ed. 2013).
189. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 9:25 (2012).
190. Id.
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faculty member to have the faculty member’s name associated with the
work. 191 Toward that end, the university should adopt an attribution
policy that requires any use of the work by the university to include
creative attribution. Faculty members can also include an attribution
provision in any sub-licenses that they grant to publishers or other third
parties. This will ensure that the faculty author is credited for his or her
contributions to the field, even though he or she is not the legal author of
a work-for-hire. One simple solution for attribution would be to include
the faculty member’s name on the same line as the copyright notice. For
example, the copyright notice appearing on the title page of a scholarly
article could read: “Created by Professor John Doe, © 2013 University
of Anystate.” In this manner, the correct copyright information is given
and, at the same time, creative attribution is clear and easy to locate.
For works already published that list a faculty member as the
copyright holder, the fact that the actual copyright holder may be the
university does not invalidate the copyright. The Copyright Act allows
copyright holders to provide notice to potential infringers that a work is
copyrighted by marking the work with a symbol and a name. 192 Under
the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, a copyright is still
valid even if the work carries no copyright notice. 193 Nimmer notes that
even when notice was required, giving notice under the wrong name did
not necessarily make the notice ineffective. 194 Mistakenly listing the
faculty member’s name in the copyright notice, therefore, should be
legally effective and not jeopardize the copyright in the work.
CONCLUSION
Current trends in copyright law leave the ownership of faculty-created
works ambiguous at best. It is possible that even the copyrights in
traditional scholarly works created by faculty members belong to their
respective universities as works-for-hire. This ambiguity results in legal
uncertainties about ownership and duration of copyrights that could
impact universities, faculty members, and assignees or licensees of these
rights.

191. See Scully, supra note 1, at 252–53 (discussing the benefits of faculty publication to the
university and to the faculty member).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
193. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) to state that notice “may” be provided rather than “shall” be
provided).
194. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 122, § 7.09; see also 17 U.S.C. § 406.
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In order to resolve these ambiguities, this Comment argues that
universities and faculty members should agree that the copyrights in
faculty works belong to the university, as an employer. The university
should then provide faculty members with an exclusive license to the
copyrights in the works that they create. This strategy would clarify
ownership, ensure that licenses provided to publishers and other third
parties are enforceable, and allow universities and faculty members to
divide the rights in ways that make sense for a variety of different types
of works. Although the university would own the copyrights, attribution
provisions and copyright notices can ensure that faculty members
receive appropriate recognition for their work.
Such a dramatic change in universities’ approach to copyrights would,
no doubt, be controversial. It is important, however, to focus on the
substantive result of any system for distributing copyrights. The current
approach, based on vague and potentially unenforceable university
policies, provides a formalistic affirmation of faculty ownership of
scholarly works, but paradoxically creates a risk that faculty members
will have no rights in their scholarly works. A licensing scheme,
however, could provide greater clarity, enforceability, and control for
faculty members, thus better serving the parties’ substantive goals.

